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WITHOUT LIMITATION: "GROUNDHOG DAY" FOR
INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS*
J. Amy Dillard**
[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individ-
ual is committed.'
INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 2000, eight-year-old Kevin Shifflett was murdered
while playing in the driveway of his great-grandmother's house in Al-
exandria, Virginia.2 The killer was not captured at the scene, so the
police conducted a massive manhunt, usingfederal indictments to
bring suspects before a grand jury.3 Witnesses told the police that the
attack on Kevin was unprovoked and that the killer, described only as
a black person, screamed racial epithets as he slashed Kevin's throat.4
The police immediately suspected that the killer suffered from serious
mental illness; many of the suspects were actively mentally ill or had
an extensive history of mental illness.5
* This subtitle stems from the film, Groundhog Day (Columbia/TriStar Home Entertainment
1993), in which the lead character, Phil Connors, lives the same day over and over again with no
logical hope of escaping from his predicament.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., Washington and
Lee University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College. I wish to thank my research assistant,
David Greengrass; my co-counsel, Joseph McCarthy; my colleagues, Elizabeth Boals, Mary
Clark, Angela Davis, Cynthia Jones, Nancy Modesitt, Jeremy Mullem, Susan Thrower, and Pe-
nelope Pether for invaluable support during the thinking and writing process; Dean Gil Holmes
for the research support that enabled the writing of this Article; and Karen Woody. This Article
is dedicated to the late Professor Roger Groot who, along with my parents, taught me to think
big and work hard; his endorsement of this proposed legislation motivated me to write this Arti-
cle and submit the legislation to the Virginia General Assembly for review.
1. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
2. Josh White, Mourners Recall "an All-American Boy," WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2000, at C3.
3. See Tom Jackman, Shifflett Suspect Explodes in Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2000, at B1.
4. See David Horowitz, The Politics of Hate, SALON, Oct. 30, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/
news/collhoro/2000/10/30/race/index.html.
5. See J. Amy Dillard, personal notes (May 2000) (on file with author). During the manhunt,
I served as the Deputy Public Defender for the City of Alexandria, and in that capacity, I fielded
numerous phone calls from suspects and their counsel, wherein I learned about the mental
health of the suspects. I currently represent Gregory Murphy, and thus, have personal knowl-
edge of the investigation beyond that which was reported in the press.
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Several months later, the police arrested Gregory Murphy, and on
October 4, 2000, the Commonwealth's Attorney indicted him for the
capital murder of Kevin Shifflett.6 On October 30, 2000, during a pre-
trial hearing in open court, Murphy punched one of his court-ap-
pointed attorneys, knocking him unconscious. The trial judge
promptly referred Murphy to the Virginia Department of Mental
Health for a competency evaluation. 7 During the initial thirty-day as-
sessment, the doctors found Murphy incompetent to stand trial and
reported this finding to the court. In accordance with Virginia Code
§ 19.2-169.1, the hospital held Murphy in a locked facility, forcibly ad-
ministered psychotropic medication pursuant to a contested court or-
der, and reassessed him for competency every six months. In each
successive competency assessment, the hospital determined that Mur-
phy was incompetent to stand trial, and at each biannual review, the
trial court agreed.
When the court entered its initial finding that Murphy was not com-
petent to stand trial, Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3 prescribed a five-year
limit on holding an incompetent pre-trial defendant. 8 Pursuant to the
statute, the trial court should have dismissed the capital murder
charge against Murphy in November 2005, five years after its initial
finding that he was incompetent to stand trial. Murphy, who remains
incompetent to stand trial today, would have been civilly committed
after the dismissal.9
But in January 2003, the Commonwealth's Attorney in Alexandria,
Virginia, asked local lawmakers to propose legislation to the Virginia
General Assembly that would eliminate the five-year limitation for
detaining incompetent defendants charged with capital murder. The
amendment would address a single pending criminal case, Common-
6. See Patricia Davis, Suspect in Shifflett Slaying Charged in Va., WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at
Al.
7. See Patricia Davis, Suspect to Make First Court Appearance Since Attack on Lawyer, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2000, at B2.
8. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(C) (2000) (amended 2003) ("If not dismissed without
prejudice at an earlier time, charges against an unrestorably incompetent defendant shall be
dismissed on the date upon which his sentence would have expired had he been convicted and
received the maximum sentence for the crime charged, or on the date five years from the date of
his arrest for such charges, whichever is sooner.").
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(A) (2000) (amended 2003) ("If the court finds that the
defendant is incompetent and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, it shall order that
he be (i) released, (ii) committed pursuant to § 37.1-67.3, (iii) reviewed for commitment pursu-
ant to § 37.1-70.6, or (iv) certified pursuant to § 37.1-65.1. If the court finds the defendant in-
competent but restorable to competency in the foreseeable future, it may order treatment
continued until six months have elapsed from the date of the defendant's initial admission under
subsection A of § 19.2-169.2.").
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wealth v. Murphy.'0 Because the defendant had already been held for
half of the statutory maximum and had exhibited no progress towards
competency, the prosecutor was worried that the clock on Murphy's
detention was running out."
The prosecutor had two concerns. First, he did not want Murphy to
dodge prosecution for capital murder, especially for the murder of a
child, where the community's attention was extremely intense. Sec-
ond, he did not want Murphy, against whom he had compiled compel-
ling evidence, to be released into the community ever again. He
feared that if Murphy became a hospitalized patient pursuant to civil
commitment, he would not necessarily remain in a locked facility.
Moreover, Murphy's opportunity for release from civil commitment
would be in the hands of doctors who use standards for release that
are not designed to protect the community from alleged murderers.12
The Virginia General Assembly, apparently with little debate,
amended § 19.2-169.3 and eliminated the five-year tolling provision
for any defendant charged with capital murder. 13 In doing so, the leg-
islature enacted a statute that unconstitutionally allows for the indefi-
nite detention of all incompetent defendants charged with capital
murder in Virginia.' 4 The use of the phrase "without limitation" in a
criminal statute should have caused concern for the lawmakers, since
unlimited pre-trial detention and due process rarely go hand in
hand. 15 The constitutional flaws of this statute could be cured with
the proposed amendment in Appendix B. Because the 2003 amend-
10. No. CF000517, 2001 WL 34037915 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 2001).
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(C) (2000) (amended 2003).
12. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-824 (2005) (detailing how often the hospital must review a
patient's progress for release); see also id. § 37.2-837 (setting forth the criteria for a patient's
release from involuntary civil commitment).
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(C) (2004 & Supp. 2006) ("Unless an incompetent defen-
dant is charged with capital murder or the charges against an incompetent criminal defendant
have been previously dismissed, charges against an unrestorably incompetent defendant shall be
dismissed on the date upon which his sentence would have expired had he been convicted and
received the maximum sentence for the crime charged, or on the date five years from the date of
his arrest for such charges, whichever is sooner."); app. A.
14. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); infra Part III.A.
15. See Dillard, supra note 5 (Aug. 2005). When asked about indefinite detention, the prose-
cutor said that he was not sure if it was constitutional and that, in twenty years or so, he would
probably move to dismiss the charge. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(E) (2004 & Supp. 2006)
("In any case when an incompetent defendant is charged with capital murder, notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, the charge shall not be dismissed and the court having juris-
diction over the capital murder case may order that the defendant receive continued treatment
under subsection A of § 19.2-169.2 for additional six-month periods without limitation, provided
that (i) a hearing pursuant to subsection E of § 19.2-169.1 is held at the completion of each such
period, (ii) the defendant remains incompetent, (iii) the court finds continued treatment to be
medically appropriate, and (iv) the defendant presents a danger to himself or others.").
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ment to § 19.2-169.3 and the proposed amendment at Appendix B
would likely be seen as procedural in nature, they could be applied to
Murphy without an ex post facto violation. 16
When the Virginia General Assembly amended § 19.2-169.3 to de-
tain incompetent capital murder defendants, many cynics saw this as
overly aggressive prosecution by the state that currently holds the
"honor" of being runner-up in execution rates. 17 But an examination
of all fifty state codes demonstrates that twenty other states also have
unconstitutional detention statutes that violate the due process rights
of incompetent defendants.1 8 The proposed amendment to § 19.2-
169.3 protects the unrestorably incompetent defendant charged with
capital murder without placing an undue burden on his right to due
process, and protects the community by requiring judicial oversight
and authorization for the capital defendant's release.
This Article offers a brief overview of the standards for determining
competency to stand trial. After examining the seminal case of Jack-
son v. Indiana,19 which held that the indefinite pre-trial detention of
incompetent defendants violates due process, this Article argues that
§ 19.2-169.3, like statutes in twenty other states, violates a defendant's
right to substantive due process, including the right to be free from
forcible medication. This Article proposes legislation that will make
the process constitutional, while addressing the concerns about the re-
lease of dangerous individuals held by the prosecutors and the
community. 20
16. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). The constitutional prohibition against laws
applied ex post facto applies to those that make innocent acts criminal, alter the nature of the
offense, or increase the punishment. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170 (1925). A constitution-
ally prohibited ex post facto amendment is one "which, in relation to the offence or its conse-
quences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228
(1883) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809)
(No. 15,285)).
17. See, e.g., M. Marshall, Death Penalty Politics Skews Outcomes Toward Execution, Smith
Says, VA. L. NEWS & EVENTS, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/
2005_fall/deathpenalty.htm. Professor Stephen Smith offered these statistics:
Virginia has the lowest number of reversals in capital cases and the highest execution
rate of any state in the country. We're number one in the death penalty, per capita.
The funding squeeze probably has something to do with that. Virginia is dead last-50
out of 50-in terms of funding indigent defense.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. See Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commit-
ment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1 (1993) (provid-
ing a comprehensive and detailed analysis of how states have applied or failed to apply the
principles of Jackson).
19. 406 U.S. 715.
20. For my proposed amendments to Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3, see app. B.
1224 [Vol. 56:1221
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II. STANDARDS USED TO DETERMINE
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The notion that a criminal defendant must be competent before
standing trial dates as far back as medieval English law. Men were
tortured if they refused to enter a plea in a criminal case, but those
with physical or mental defects were spared.21 No conventional the-
ory of punishment could be justified if the defendant was not compe-
tent to understand the charges against him, the nature of the
proceedings, or the reasons for his prosecution. William Blackstone
declared that any man who became "mad" after committing a crime
should not be arraigned if he was unable to make the proper pleadings
in his defense. 22
There is very little common law addressing competency to stand
trial. Most common law arises from appellate court opinions, but
competency decisions are rarely reviewed by these courts. The rea-
sons are two-fold. First, only the defendant has the right to appeal a
competency decision.23 While the defendant's lawyers "will often
have the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in
his defense," 24 they resort to this argument only in unusual cases.
Where a defendant is charged with a minor offense, even a minor fel-
ony, defense counsel will carefully consider whether it is in the defen-
dant's best interest to be found incompetent to stand trial or to limp
through the proceedings without raising the issue. In many cases, de-
fendants with serious mental illness may spend more time confined, in
a pre-trial posture, while the hospital tries to restore them to compe-
tency or, even worse, be held indefinitely under a civil commitment
after being found unrestorable. Only in the most serious cases, where
the defendant is facing significant jail time or execution, would a de-
fense attorney actively pursue a finding of incompetency on a defen-
dant's behalf.25 Second, in the vast majority of cases where a
defendant is incompetent, there will be little debate over whether the
defendant is actually incompetent to stand trial. Both the prosecutor
and the defendant will simply agree to dismiss the criminal charges in
favor of civil commitment.
21. Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
193, 201 (2004).
22. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *24.
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-398(A) (2004 & Supp. 2006) (noting that, in felony cases, the
Commonwealth may appeal only dismissals and motions to suppress based on constitutional
violations).
24. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992).
25. These difficult ethical questions could be the topic of another article but are not the cen-
tral focus here.
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In 1960, the Supreme Court set out an explicit test for determining a
defendant's competency to stand trial in Dusky v. United States.26 The
Court held that the trial court must ascertain whether the defendant
"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reason-
able degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'2 7
The Court rejected the notion that merely being "oriented to time and
place and [having] some recollection of events" was sufficient to qual-
ify a defendant as competent to stand trial.2 8 In Drope v. Missouri,29
the Court suggested that the defendant should also have the present
ability to assist counsel in preparing a defense.30
The method of conducting a competency evaluation by a qualified
forensic assessor varies from state to state, 31 but the Court requires an
assessment in every case where the evidence raises sufficient doubt as
to a defendant's competency. 32 The Court has not specifically defined
"sufficient doubt." Instead it has created a flexible set of factors for
the trial court to consider, including a defendant's irrational behavior
and demeanor in court, prior medical opinions of a defendant's com-
petency, and concerns raised by defense counsel. 33 If even one of
these factors is satisfied, a competency evaluation may be required.34
The guidelines for determining whether a defendant is competent to
stand trial vary widely among the states. Most states use the "rational
understanding" test set out in Dusky,35 though eight states still en-
dorse the arcane "rational manner" test first introduced in 1847.36
Under the "rational manner" test, the trial court simply may observe
the defendant's conduct to determine competency to stand trial.37
The more modern "rational understanding" test, however, requires an
26. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389
(1993) (explaining that the Dusky standard applies to competency to stand trial, competency to
waive the right to counsel, and competency to enter a guilty plea).
28. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
30. Id. at 171.
31. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (2004 & Supp. 2006) (explaining which profession-
als are qualified to conduct a court-ordered competency evaluation).
32. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
33. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 179-80; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86.
34. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 179-80.
35. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
36. See Morris et al., supra note 21, at 204-05 & n.56 (noting that the eight states are Califor-
nia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming).
37. That eight states still have this test in place is a testament to how slowly legislatures react
and conform to decisions of the Supreme Court, since the Court has required a medical evalua-
tion for well over thirty years.
[Vol. 56:12211226
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assessment of a defendant's rational understanding of the proceed-
ings, his factual understanding of the case, and his present ability to
consult with lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing, often defined as the present ability to assist counsel.3 The recent
wave of medical literature on the subject of assessing competency sug-
gests that many doctors may be using a "rational thinking" test that
factors intellectual capacity into the competency determination.3 9 As
recently as November 2005, Professor Grant Morris suggested that
"rational manner" and "rational understanding" might not be linked
to "rational thinking" at all. 40 In fact, the newest group of incompe-
tent defendants may be those who lack the ability for abstract reason-
ing and decisionmaking and who will likely never acquire it.41
Medical experts currently criticize "competency training" for defend-
ants because the training leads only to superficial knowledge-noth-
ing close to the skills needed to assist in preparing a defense.
An unknown number of criminal defendants are deemed incompe-
tent to stand trial each year under some form of competency test. But
as expertise among forensic evaluators deepens, and the medical com-
munity establishes criteria for competency beyond that required by
the letter of the law, more defendants with the superficial knowledge
required by Dusky may be found incompetent. 42 Thus, more and
more mentally ill defendants will suffer indefinite pre-trial detention
under unconstitutional statutes that allow for detention without
limitation. 43
III. ANALYSIS
A. Indefinite Detention of Incompetent Pre-trial Defendants Violates
the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee of Due Process
Like all citizens, defendants charged with capital murder are enti-
tled to due process of law before being deprived of their liberty.44 In
cases where a defendant is detained before trial because he is incom-
petent, the defendant is entitled to a meaningful review of his compe-
tency and of his continued detention. In Jackson, the Supreme Court
38. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72; Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
39. See, e.g., Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Develop-
ment and Validation of a Research Instrument, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (1997).
40. Grant H. Morris, Professor at the University of Pittsburgh Law School, Distinguished
Nordenberg Lecture in Law and Psychiatry: Is Competency to Stand Trial Assessed Compe-
tently? (Nov. 10, 2005).
41. See, e.g., Hoge et al., supra note 39.
42. Morris, supra note 40.
43. Morris & Meloy, supra note 18.
44. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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addressed the unconstitutionality of indefinite pre-trial detention.45
The current version of § 19.2-169.3 violates the principles of Jackson,
which require that "the State must either institute the customary civil
commitment proceeding' that w6id be required to commit indefi-
nitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. 46
In Jackson, the trial court found the defendant, a deaf mute with the
mental capacity of a preschool child, incompetent to stand trial for
two counts of robbery.47 Pursuant to the Indiana competency statute,
the trial court ordered Jackson committed to the Indiana Department
of Mental Health until the Department could certify him as sane.
48
The two doctors appointed by the trial court to examine Jackson
agreed that his communication skills were almost nonexistent and that
it was extremely unlikely that he could ever learn to read, write, or use
sign language because of his profound mental deficiency. 49 The doc-
tors concluded that his "prognosis appear[ed] rather dim" and that,
even if Jackson were not a deaf mute, he would still be incompetent to
stand trial.50 Despite this testimony, the trial court ordered that Jack-
son be detained until he attained competency to stand trial. 51
Because of his condition and the dim prognosis, the trial court ef-
fectively rendered a decision to detain Jackson indefinitely without a
trial. The trial judge did not use Indiana's procedure for civilly com-
mitting the "feeble-minded," which would have afforded Jackson
more protection.52 With the continued pre-trial detention, Jackson
did not have a right to counsel (though he did have counsel) nor a
right to periodic reviews. Because of the prognosis that he would
never be restored to competency, he had no hope for release at any
time in the future.5 3 On appeal, the Court held that this type of pre-
trial detention constituted indefinite commitment of a criminal defen-
dant solely because of his incompetence to stand trial and thus vio-
45. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
46. Id. at 738.
47. Id. at 717, 720.
48. Id. at 718-19. Sanity and competency are not interchangeable legal terms, though courts
often use them interchangeably. Competency to stand trial is a pre-trial determination based on
the Dusky factors. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Insanity is an affirmative
defense, raised by the defendant, who alleges that he suffered from a mental defect at the time of
the offense and could not distinguish between right and wrong. The trial court in Jackson un-
doubtedly meant competency rather than sanity.
49. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718-19.
50. Id. at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 721 (citing an Indiana statute that offered the subject of the commitment the right to
an examination by two psychiatrists, representation by counsel, and the opportunity for release
after commitment based on the recommendation of the superintendent of the institution).
53. Id. at 720-21.
[Vol. 56:12211228
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lated Jackson's constitutional right to due process.5 4 The Court noted
that "due process requires that the nature and duration of the commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the indi-
vidual is committed. ' 55 Jackson was a chronically incompetent
defendant, and whatever the cause of this incompetency, the Court
held that, if the likelihood of restoration is nonexistent, the trial court
could not constitutionally detain him.
B. Violations of the Due Process Rights of Incompetent
Defendants in Virginia and Beyond
The vast majority of defendants who are referred to the hospital for
a competency evaluation will be found competent to stand trial or be
restored to competency within a year.5 6 Prior to the 2003 amend-
ments to Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3, all incompetent criminal defend-
ants charged with felonies were treated equally. If the hospital
determined that any defendant was not competent to stand trial, it
advised the court of its findings and followed the court's order to con-
tinue treatment to restore the defendant to competency.5 7 The trial
court had the authority to order forcible medication for the sole pur-
pose of restoring the defendant to competency, so long as it found a
reasonable likelihood of restoration, no less intrusive alternative, and
that the medication was otherwise medically appropriate.58
The legislature has implemented a time limit for the court to wait
for competency and has effectively declared all unrestored incompe-
tent defendants unrestorable after five years.59 Under § 19.2-
169.3(C), for defendants charged with any crime except capital mur-
der, the charge shall be dismissed and the defendant civilly committed
after five years of being found incompetent.6 Civil commitment re-
quires the court to find that the defendant presents an imminent dan-
54. Id. at 731. There was virtually no chance that Jackson would be released because he had
no chance of improving. The Court explained that, to accomplish the indefinite detention of
Jackson, the trial court needed to follow the proceedings in place for indefinite civil commit-
ment. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. By treating Jackson differently from other citizens who had
been civilly committed, simply because he was charged with a crime, Indiana violated Jackson's
right to equal protection of the laws. Id. at 737-39.
55. Id. at 738.
56. Interview with Dr. Lillian Tidler, Forensic Med. Dir., Cent. State Hosp., in Petersburg, Va.
(Sept. 2004).
57. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(A) (2000) (amended 2003).
58. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
59. Some might say that after five years of biannual findings of incompetence, no defendant
has the required promise of restoration.
60. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(C) (2004 & Supp. 2006) (stating that the maximum pe-
riod of pre-trial detention for defendants charged with misdemeanors is the maximum sentence,
which in Virginia would be no longer than twelve months).
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ger to himself or others before the court detains the defendant for
treatment.
61
Since the 2003 amendment to § 19.2-169.3, a defendant charged
with capital murder who is deemed incompetent to stand trial for
more than five years, or who is deemed unrestorably incompetent,
might never have the opportunity to have the charges against him dis-
missed and be civilly committed. Instead, the court will continue to
review the defendant for competency, and the hospital will continue
to try to restore the defendant to competency, even if it determines
that restoration is impossible. 62 Every six months, the court will re-
view the hospital's competency evaluation, and as long as it concludes
that the defendant is not competent to stand trial, the court will detain
the defendant and return him to the hospital for further treatment.63
The standard for determining whether the defendant is dangerous is
not explicit in the statute. However, subsection E states that a defen-
dant may indefinitely receive treatment for six-month periods pro-
vided that four conditions are met: "(i) a hearing pursuant to
subsection E of § 19.2-169.1 is held at the completion of each such
period, (ii) the defendant remains incompetent, (iii) the court finds
continued treatment to be medically appropriate, and (iv) the defen-
dant presents a danger to himself or others." 64 Absent instructions to
the contrary, one must presume that the finding of the defendant's
dangerousness is made according to the hearing required by subsec-
tion E of § 19.2-169.1, which states that "the party alleging that the
defendant is incompetent shall bear the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the defendant's incompetency. '65
The Jackson Court also noted that, in Greenwood v. United States,
the Court had upheld a federal statute granting the government au-
thority to civilly commit a defendant found likely unrestorably incom-
petent for an indefinite period of time.66 In so ruling, the Court
endorsed the statute, which required the trial court to make an ex-
plicit finding during any commitment proceeding that the defendant
was "dangerous to the safety of the officers, property, or other inter-
61. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-814 to -815 (2005) (providing in relevant part that "the person
(i) does or does not present an imminent danger to himself or others as a result of mental illness
or is or is not so seriously mentally ill as to be substantially unable to care for himself and (ii)
requires or does not require involuntary inpatient treatment").
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(C), (E) (2004 & Supp. 2006).
63. See id.
64. Id. § 19.2-169.3(E).
65. Id. § 19.2-169.1(E).
66. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 716, 726 (1972) (citing Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S.
366, 375 (1956)).
1230 [Vol. 56:1221
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ests of the United States. '67 Central to the Court's holding in Green-
wood, however, was the provision that the defendant was entitled to
be released once a trial court determined that he was no longer dan-
gerous, even if his competence to stand trial had not been achieved. 68
In contrast, although Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3 requires a finding of
dangerousness, however low the standard for making that determina-
tion, it makes no provision for a defendant's release should he no
longer present a danger to himself or others.
By unconstitutional legislative fiat, the unrestorably incompetent
capital defendant will be permanently detained without standing trial
or being found guilty. 69 Moreover, because of the pre-trial posture of
the biannual reviews, the court need only find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant is incompetent, that treatment is med-
ically appropriate, and that the defendant presents a danger to himself
or others. 70 To detain any citizen under civil commitment, a court
must determine whether "the person (i) does or does not present an
imminent danger to himself or others as a result of mental illness or is
or is not so seriously mentally ill as to be substantially unable to care
for himself and (ii) requires or does not require involuntary inpatient
treatment."' 71 The clear goal of § 19.2-169.3(C) is the indefinite deten-
tion of incompetent defendants charged with capital murder without
the prospect of release in the community and without restoration to
competency, both of which are impossible for the unrestorably incom-
petent capital defendant. 72
67. Id. (citing Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 375).
68. Id. at 732 (citing Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 374).
69. In addition to Virginia, three states-Maryland, Rhode Island, and South Carolina-spec-
ify different procedures for defendants charged with capital crimes.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(C), (E) (2004 & Supp. 2006); see also id. § 19.2-169.1.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-815 (2005).
72. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (explaining the Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right of criminal defendants). Any defendant held indefinitely under the burden of a criminal
charge may have a viable motion to dismiss for a violation of the right to a speedy trial if he is
ever restored to competency. With an eye towards the defendant's right to a speedy trial, § 19.2-
169.3(C) dictates that charges against all unrestorably incompetent defendants, except those
charged with capital murder, shall be dismissed within five years of the date of arrest. The
speedy trial issue has not come before the Court in the Jackson context, but the principles articu-
lated in Barker apply to indefinite detention while a criminal charge is pending and there is no
expectation of a trial. The Court has not established a bright-line test to determine at what point
a defendant would suffer a speedy trial violation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527; see also U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial .... ). Instead, the Court set out four factors for examination: (1) the length of the delay,
(2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant has actually asserted his right, and (4)
whether the delay served to prejudice the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. In Klopfer v.
North Carolina, the Court held that the right to a speedy trial, "one of the most basic rights
preserved by the Constitution," is covered by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus is binding on
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Additionally, § 19.2-169.3 violates the incompetent capital defen-
dant's right to remain free from forcible medication. As the Court
declared in Washington v. Harper, "The forcible injection of medica-
tion into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial inter-
ference with that person's liberty. '73 The Court has acknowledged
that inmates have the right to remain free from the serious, debilitat-
ing effects of psychotropic medication, unless there is a determination
that "the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is
in the inmate's medical interest. ' 74 Without a determination of medi-
cal appropriateness and an overriding justification, forcing antip-
sychotic medication on an inmate is impermissible; the trial court must
always consider less intrusive alternatives. 75 Finally, the trial court
should determine whether the forcible medication will "significantly
further" the state's interest in prosecution, as required by Sell v.
United States.76 Section 19.2-169.3 ignores the fact that the state could
not possibly meet the requirement of significantly furthering its inter-
ests in prosecuting an incompetent capital defendant who has been
deemed unrestorable. 77 The state may have a significant interest in
bringing the incompetent capital defendant to trial, but reading Sell
and Jackson together, the trial court must make an explicit finding
that the forcible medication will significantly further the state's prose-
cution and that the defendant's detention will bear a "reasonable rela-
tion to the purpose for which the individual is committed. '78 The
the states. 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967). The speedy trial right is one of the provisions of the Magna
Carta that endured in the early days of the American legal system. Darren Allen, Note, The
Constitutional Floor Doctrine and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 101 (2004)
(providing a useful historical summary). George Mason incorporated the right to a speedy trial
in drafting the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776. Id. at 103 & n.14. The Commonwealth of
Virginia has opted to set a bright-line test for speedy trial determinations, though there is an
exception to the rules if "the failure to try the accused [within the proscribed time limits] was
caused ... [b]y . . .[the accused's] confinemefit in a hospital for care and observation." VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (2004).
73. 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
74. Id. at 227.
75. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
76. 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003). The Court decided Sell after the Virginia legislature amended
Virginia Code § 19.2-169.3, but the Virginia Attorney General has declined to present my pro-
posed legislation, which complies with the holding in Sell.
77. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3(E) (2004 & Supp. 2006) (explaining that the court must
determine only if the defendant is a danger to self or others and that continued treatment is
medically appropriate, and ignoring the requirement of significantly furthering the state's inter-
est in prosecution).
78. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); accord Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (holding that the
court must weigh the side effects against the community's need to prosecute); Dina E. Klepner,
Note, Sell v. United States: Is the Supreme Court Giving a Dose of Bad Medicine?: The Consti-
tutionality of the Right to Forcibly Medicate Mentally Ill Defendants for Purposes of Trial Compe-
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unrestorably incompetent capital defendant is detained for public
safety reasons, not for restoration and prosecution; thus, both the de-
tention and the forcible medication violate due process guarantees.
States handle the procedures concerning incompetent defendants in
different ways. All states call for a hearing on incompetence once the
issue is raised, and all have examinations to determine whether a de-
fendant is competent, incompetent but likely to regain competence in
the foreseeable future, or unrestorably incompetent. After that initial
determination, state laws differ considerably.7 9 Virginia, the District
of Columbia, and nineteen other states do not comply with the re-
quirements of Jackson.80 In those states, Murphy and similarly situ-
ated defendants will remain confined indefinitely, based solely on the
tence, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 727 (2005) (offering a detailed description of how courts should handle
the forcible medication issue for defendants charged with nonviolent crimes).
79. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 18 (providing a comprehensive and extremely detailed
look at how the states have complied with or ignored the principles of Jackson).
80. The District of Columbia and twenty states do not comply with the principles of Jackson.
In eleven states, a court can order treatment indefinitely for a defendant in the hopes of restor-
ing competency. This includes states where there is no time limit for determining whether there
is a substantial likelihood that the defendant will ever regain competency and states where the
law provides only that a determination must be made in a reasonable time but does not define a
reasonable time. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404 (2001); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.212, 3.213;
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01; MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. & COUNTY CT. PRAC. 9.06; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 552.020 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-221 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1823
(LexisNexis 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.425 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-301 (2001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3 (2004 & Supp. 2006); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303 (2005).
In nine other states and the District of Columbia, the defendant's fate is tied to the maximum
time for which he could be sentenced for the most severe crime of which he is accused or the
statute of limitations for bringing charges on that crime. For a defendant facing a life sentence or
the death penalty, there is no limit on how long he can be held. The court may order treatment
toward regaining competency for the maximum sentence allowable, or after commitment the
charges against the defendant may not be dismissed until he has been confined for the maximum
sentence allowable. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-8-112, -114.5 (West 2006); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-56d (2001 & Supp. 2006); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-531.06-.08 (LexisNexis
2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 15-17 (2003); N.M. STAT. §§ 31-9-1.3-.5 (2000); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW §§ 730.50, .70 (McKinney 1995); N.D. CErNr. CODE § 12.1-04-08 (1997); 50 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7402-7403 (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-10A-4, 14-15 (1998); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 27-6A-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
On the other hand, thirty states comply with the principles of Jackson to varying degrees. In
seven states, within a definite time period, the court de termines whether a defendant is un-
restorably incompetent, then either initiates civil commitment proceedings or releases the defen-
dant and dismisses the charges. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.110 (2006); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/104-23 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.9 (West Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 101-B (2003 & Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:17-a (LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.370 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.77.025, .090, .092
(West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
In four states, within a definite time period, the court determines whether a defendant is un-
restorably incompetent, then either initiates civil commitment proceedings or releases the defen-
dant upon a designation of unrestorable, but does not dismiss the charges until a later date. See,
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 3-106 to -108 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2006); MICH.
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criminal charges against them; this is an inadequate basis for indefinite
detention, and it violates the guarantee of due process.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION
The legislation proposed in Appendix B offers a detailed solution to
the constitutional problem created by § 19.2-169.3. States have long
had the authority to seek indefinite civil commitment for their citi-
zens.8' Moreover, the Virginia General Assembly has crafted alterna-
tive methods of release for defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity and for citizens civilly committed as sexually violent
predators. 82 In each of these proceedings, the sentencing court retains
the ultimate decision over the release of the patient, thus protecting
against release by an unwitting doctor who is unaware of the nature of
the alleged offense that initiated the commitment. 83 Having a judicial
gatekeeper to release defendants from indefinite civil commitment is
somewhat novel, as only eight states currently follow that protocol.84
The proposed amendment to § 19.2-169.3 and the adoption of pro-
posed § 19.2-169.3.185 create a mechanism for detaining the un-
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.2020-.2044 (West 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.38-.39 (Lex-
isNexis 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3 (1997).
In five states, within a definite time period, the court determines whether a defendant is un-
restorably incompetent, then either initiates civil commitment proceedings or releases the defen-
dant, but leaves the charges on the books, which the court may dismiss at its discretion. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1370, 1370.01 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-212
(2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1002 to -1003, -1008
(2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-23-430 to -460 (2002 & Supp. 2006).
In twelve states, within a definite time period, the court determines whether a defendant is
unrestorably incompetent, then either initiates civil commitment proceedings or releases the de-
fendant, but leave the charges on the books and either there is no explicit provision regarding
dismissal or the charges are dismissed only if the defendant is released. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM.
P. 11.6; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-130 (2004); HAw. REV. STAT. § 704-406 (LexisNexis 2003 &
Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-3 (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2006); KAN. CRIM. CODE
ANN. § 22-3303 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.110 (LexisNexis 1999 &
Supp. 2006); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 648 (2003 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, §§ 1175.5-.6 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.071, .079,
.084, .107 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-6 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4817
(1998); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 971.14 (West 2007).
Finally, in two states, within a definite time period, the court determines whether a defendant
is unrestorably incompetent, and the law provides that a court may commit or release a defen-
dant but does not make clear what happens if the court chooses not to do either. See, e.g., ARIZ.
R. CRIM. P. 11.5; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310 (West 2006).
81. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 736.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-905 (2005).
83. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality of a scheme
that gives the trial court the power to release the defendant).
84. Eight states require the committing court to approve a defendant's release from commit-
ment: Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.
85. See app. B.
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restorably incompetent defendant who is charged with capital murder;
they could be applied to any defendant deemed dangerous enough to
require additional burdens to being released from civil commitment. 86
Further, the proposed amendments clarify the protocol for forcibly
medicating a defendant to restore him to competency. 87 The Com-
monwealth may forcibly medicate a defendant when important gov-
ernmental interests are at stake, but only if the "administration of the
drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to
stand trial."'88
Statutes are usually amended when a court declares the statute un-
constitutional. The method of challenge through litigation works for
those who stand only to gain by the challenge. The situation of the
incompetent capital defendant is markedly different, since the ulti-
mate risk in any capital case is trial, a sentence of death, and execu-
tion. The court cannot constitutionally force an incompetent
defendant to face any of those risks. But the capital defendant has a
right to be free from indefinite detention that bears no relation to the
purpose for which he is detained. In order to challenge that statute,
the incompetent capital defendant must risk the possibility that the
court will use his constitutional challenge as a means for finding him
competent, after which it could force him to stand trial and sentence
him to death.
While the goal of detaining unrestorably incompetent capital de-
fendants has some merit because the community will be safer as a
result of the detention, this interest does not outweigh the incompe-
tent capital defendant's right to due process. Moreover, the two com-
peting interests need not be at odds, as the proposed amendment to
§ 19.2-169.3 demonstrates. The defendant can be held and treated
like other chronically mentally ill citizens without the sword of a capi-
tal case hanging over his head. Furthermore, the community can feel
safer knowing that the defendant is receiving appropriate treatment
and that a judge, who will know the nature of the original criminal
charge and the progress the defendant has made in treatment, will act
86. Upon reviewing my proposed amendments, the late Professor Roger Groot, of Washing-
ton and Lee University Law School, remarked that "lots of defendants are bat-shit crazy and a
whole lot scarier than many who are charged with capital murder." In particular, he referred to
those charged with arson as a means to murder under Virginia Code § 18.2-32.
87. See app. B.
88. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003); accord Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
133-34 (1992) (holding that only an essential or overriding state interest might overcome an
individual's liberty "interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs");
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (holding that an individual has "a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs").
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as the ultimate gatekeeper over the defendant's release into the
community.
The legislature should aspire to meet constitutional muster in every
piece of legislation it enacts. With §19.2-169.3, the legislature may,
however, need to examine its haste in passing unconstitutional legisla-
tion, admit its error, and undertake to perform its job more deliber-
ately. Finally, the legislature should undertake this task before a
defendant successfully challenges the statute and becomes eligible for
release without proper safeguards to ensure a safe community.
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 19.2-169.3
A. If, at any time after the defendant is ordered to undergo treatment
pursuant to subsection A of § 19.2-169.2, the director of the treating
facility concludes that the defendant is likely to remain incompetent
for the foreseeable future, he shall send a report to the court so stat-
ing. The report shall also indicate whether, in the director's opinion,
the defendant should be released, committed pursuant to § 37.1-67.3,
committed pursuant to § 37.1-70.9, or certified pursuant to § 37.1-65.1
in the event he is found to be unrestorably incompetent. Upon receipt
of the report, the court shall make a competency determination ac-
cording to the procedures specified in subsection E of § 19.2-169.1. If
the court finds that the defendant is incompetent and is likely to re-
main so for the foreseeable future, it shall order that he be (i) re-
leased, (ii) committed pursuant to § 37.1-67.3, (iii) reviewed for
commitment pursuant to § 37.1-70.6, or (iv) certified pursuant to
§ 37.1-65.1. If the court finds the defendant incompetent but restor-
able to competency in the foreseeable future, it may order treatment
continued until six months have elapsed from the date of the defen-
dant's initial admission under subsection A of § 19.2-169.2.
B. At the end of six months from the date of the defendant's initial
admission under subsection A of § 19.2-169.2 if the defendant remains
incompetent in the opinion of the director, the director shall so notify
the court and make recommendations concerning disposition of the
defendant as described above. The court shall hold a hearing accord-
ing to the procedures specified in subsection E of § 19.2-169.1 and, if it
finds the defendant unrestorably incompetent, shall order one of the
dispositions described above. If the court finds the defendant incom-
petent but restorable to competency, it may order continued treat-
ment under subsection A of § 19.2-169.2 for additional six-month
periods, provided a hearing pursuant to subsection E of § 19.2-169.1 is
held at the completion of each such period and the defendant contin-
ues to be incompetent but restorable to competency in the foreseeable
future.
C. Unless an incompetent defendant is charged with capital murder
or the charges against an incompetent criminal defendant have been
previously dismissed, charges against an unrestorably incompetent de-
fendant shall be dismissed on the date upon which his sentence would
have expired had he been convicted and received the maximum sen-
tence for the crime charged, or on the date five years from the date of
his arrest for such charges, whichever is sooner.
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D. If the court orders an unrestorably incompetent defendant to be
reviewed for commitment pursuant to § 37.1-70.6, it shall order the
Attorney for the Commonwealth in the jurisdiction wherein the de-
fendant was charged and the Commissioner of the Department of
Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services to
provide the Attorney General with any information relevant to the
review, including, but not limited to: (i) a copy of the warrant or in-
dictment, (ii) a copy of the defendant's criminal record, (iii) informa-
tion about the alleged crime, (iv) a copy of the competency report
completed pursuant to § 19.2-169.1, and (v) a copy of the report pre-
pared by the director of the defendant's treating facility pursuant to
this section. The court shall further order that the defendant be held
in the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retarda-
tion and Substance Abuse Services for secure confinement and treat-
ment until the Attorney General's review and any subsequent hearing
or trial are completed. If the court receives notice that the Attorney
General has declined to file a petition for the commitment of an un-
restorably incompetent defendant as a sexually violent predator after
conducting a review pursuant to § 37.1-70.6, the court shall order that
the defendant be released, committed pursuant to § 37.1-67.3, or certi-
fied pursuant to § 37.1-65.1.
E. In any case when an incompetent defendant is charged with capital
murder, notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the
charge shall not be dismissed and the court having jurisdiction over
the capital murder case may order that the defendant receive contin-
ued treatment under subsection A of § 19.2-169.2 for additional six-
month periods without limitation, provided that (i) a hearing pursuant
to subsection E of § 19.2-169.1 is held at the completion of each such
period, (ii) the defendant remains incompetent, (iii) the court finds
continued treatment to be medically appropriate, and (iv) the defen-
dant presents a danger to himself or others.
F. The Attorney for the Commonwealth may bring charges that have
been dismissed against the defendant when he is restored to
competency.
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APPENDIX B: PROPOSED CHANGE TO VIRGINIA CODE
SECTION 19.2-169.3
Section 1. Exception for Capital Murder Defendants
Section 19.2-169.3(E) is amended by striking the entire section and
inserting the following:
E. In any case when an incompetent defendant is charged with capital
murder, notwithstanding any other provision of this section, upon a
report by the director of the treating facility that he is unrestorably
incompetent, the court wherein he was charged shall order a review
pursuant to § 19.2-169.3.1(C).
Insert the following new section: Section 19.2-169.3.1
Section 2. Procedures for Unrestorable Capital Murder Defendants
A. DEFINITIONS: The following words and phrases when used in this
article shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise:
"Commissioner" means the Commissioner of the Department of
Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services.
"Defendant" means any person charged with a capital murder offense
pursuant to §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-18, or 18.2-40 who is deemed an un-
restorably incompetent defendant pursuant to § 19.2-169.3 and is re-
ferred for commitment review pursuant to subsection C of this
section.
"Director" means the Director of the Department of Corrections.
"Hospitalization" means appropriate treatment, as determined by the
Commissioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance
Abuse Services pursuant to § 19.2-169.3.2, for persons civilly commit-
ted in accordance with this act.
B. RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS: In hearings held pursuant to this article,
defendants shall have the following rights:
1. To receive adequate notice of the proceeding.
2. To be represented by counsel.
3. To remain silent or to testify.
4. To be present during the hearing.
5. To present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
6. To view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file.
In no event shall a defendant be permitted, as a part of any proceed-
ings under this article, to raise challenges to the validity of his prior
criminal sentences or institutional convictions.
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C. REVIEW OF UNRESTORABLY INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS
CHARGED WITH CAPITAL MURDER; PETITION FOR COMMITMENT;
PROCEDURE FOR COMMITMENT HEARING:
1. In any case where a defendant charged with capital murder is
found unrestorably incompetent, the court wherein he was charged,
pursuant to § 19.2-169.3(E), shall issue an order referring the defen-
dant for review to the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall
have 90 days to conduct a review of such defendant and (i) file a peti-
tion for the civil commitment of such defendant or (ii) notify the
Commissioner that he will not file a petition for commitment, in which
case the defendant shall be released. Petitions for commitment shall
be filed in the circuit court wherein the defendant was deemed un-
restorably incompetent and referred for commitment review pursuant
to § 19.2-169.3.
2. In determining whether to file a petition to civilly commit a defen-
dant under this article, the Attorney General shall review (i) the de-
fendant's warrant or indictment, (ii) the competency reports
completed pursuant to § 19.2-169.1, (iii) the report and recommenda-
tions prepared by the director of the defendant's treating facility pur-
suant to § 19.2-169.3, (iv) the defendant's criminal offense history, (v)
information about the alleged crime, and (vi) any other factor relevant
to the determination of whether the defendant should be civilly
committed.
3. Notwithstanding § 19.2-299.1 or any other provision of law, the At-
torney General is authorized to possess, copy and use pre-sentence
reports, post-sentence reports and victim impact statements for all
lawful purposes.
4. Any person who is the subject of a petition for civil commitment
under this article shall have, prior to a hearing, the right to employ
experts, at his own expense, to perform examinations and testify on
his behalf. However, if a person has not employed an expert and re-
quests expert assistance, the judge shall appoint such experts as he
deems necessary to perform examinations and participate in the hear-
ing on the person's behalf. Any expert appointed to assist the person
on matters relating to the person's mental health, including examina-
tion, evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment, shall be a licensed psychia-
trist or licensed clinical psychologist. Any expert employed or
appointed pursuant to this section shall have reasonable access to all
relevant medical and psychological records and reports pertaining to
the person he has been employed or appointed to represent.
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5. Each psychiatrist, psychologist, or other expert ,appointed by the
court to render professional service pursuant to this article who is not
regularly employed by the Commonwealth of Virginia, except by the
University of Virginia School of Medicine and the Virginia Common-
wealth University School of Medicine, shall receive a reasonable fee
for such service. The fee shall be determined in each instance by the
court that appointed the expert, in accordance with guidelines estab-
lished by the Supreme Court after consultation with the Department
of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services.
The fee shall not exceed $5,000; however, if any such expert is re-
quired to appear as a witness in any hearing held pursuant to this arti-
cle, he shall receive mileage and a fee of $750 for each day during
which he is required to serve. An itemized account of expenses, duly
sworn to, must be presented to the court, and when allowed shall be
certified to the Supreme Court for payment out of the state treasury,
and be charged against the appropriations made to pay criminal
charges. Allowance for the fee and for the per diem authorized shall
also be made by order of the court, duly certified to the Supreme
Court for payment out of the appropriation to pay criminal charges.
D. COMMITMENT HEARING; PROCEDURES:
1. If the Attorney General files a petition for civil commitment, the
court wherein the defendant was charged shall hold a hearing to de-
termine if the defendant presents an undue risk to public safety.
2. The burden of proof at the hearing shall be upon the Common-
wealth to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that the
committed person presents an undue risk to public safety.
3. If the court finds, based upon the report of the director of the treat-
ing facility and other evidence provided at the hearing, that the com-
mitted person's condition does not present an undue risk to public
safety, the court shall (i) release the committed person from confine-
ment if he does not need inpatient hospitalization and does not meet
the criteria for conditional release set forth in subsection H, provided
the court has approved a discharge plan prepared by the Department
of Mental Health, Mental Retardation. and Substance Abuse Services
or (ii) place the committed person on conditional release if he meets
the criteria for conditional release, and the court has approved a con-
ditional release plan prepared by the Department of Mental Health,
Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services. However, if the
court finds that the committed person presents an undue risk to public
safety, it shall order that the charges against him be dropped and that
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he remain in thecustody of the Commissioner for secure inpatient
hospitalization and treatment.
E. PLACEMENT OF COMMITTED PERSONS:
1. Any person committed pursuant to this article shall be placed in
the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation
and Substance Abuse Services for control, care, and treatment intil
such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder
has so changed that the person will not present an undue risk to public
safety. The Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and
Substance Abuse Services shall provide such control, care, and treat-
ment at a facility operated by it, or may contract with private or public
entities, within or without the Commonwealth, and with other states
to provide comparable control, care, and treatment. At all times, per-
sons committed for control, care, and treatment by the Department of
Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services
pursuant to this article shall be kept in a secure facility.
The Commissioner may make treatment and management decisions
regarding committed persons in his custody without obtaining prior
approval of or review by the committing court, but the treatment deci-
sions must comply with § 19.2-169.3.2.
F. REVIEW OF CONTINUATION OF CONFINEMENT HEARING; PROCE-
DURE AND REPORTS; DISPOSITION:
1. The committing court shall conduct a hearing 12 months after the
date of commitment to assess each committed person's need for con-
tinued inpatient hospitalization. A hearing for assessment shall be
conducted at yearly intervals for five years and at biennial intervals
thereafter. The court shall schedule the matter for hearing as soon as
possible after it becomes due, giving the matter priority over all pend-
ing matters before the court.
2. Prior to the hearing, the Commissioner shall provide to the court a
report reevaluating the committed person's condition and recom-
mending treatment, to be prepared by a licensed psychiatrist or a li-
censed clinical psychologist. If the Commissioner's report
recommends release or the committed person requests release, the
committed person's condition and need for inpatient hospitalization
shall be evaluated by a second person with such credentials who is not
currently treating the committed person. Any professional person
who conducts a second evaluation of a committed person shall submit
a report of his findings to the court and the Commissioner. A copy of
any report submitted pursuant to this subsection shall be sent to the
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Attorney General and to the Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the
defendant was charged.
3. The burden of proof at the hearing shall be upon the Common-
wealth to prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that the
committed person remains an undue risk to public safety.
4. If the court finds, based upon the report and other evidence pro-
vided at the hearing, that the committed person's condition has so
changed that he is no longer an undue risk to public safety, the court
shall (i) release the committed person from confinement if he does not
need inpatient hospitalization and does not meet the criteria for con-
ditional release set forth in subsection H, provided the court has ap-
proved a discharge plan prepared by the Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services or (ii)
place the committed person on conditional release if he meets the cri-
teria for conditional release, and the court has approved a conditional
release plan prepared by the Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services. However, if the court
finds that the committed person remains an undue risk to public
safety, it shall order that he remain in the custody of the Commis-
sioner for secure inpatient hospitalization and treatment.
G. PETITION FOR RELEASE; HEARING; PROCEDURES:
1. The Commissioner may petition the committing court for condi-
tional or unconditional release of the committed person at any time he
believes the committed person's condition has so changed that he is
no longer an undue risk to public safety in need of treatment and se-
cure confinement. The petition shall be accompanied by a report of
clinical findings supporting the petition and by a conditional release or
discharge plan, as applicable, prepared by the Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services. The com-
mitted person may petition the committing court for release only once
in each year. The party petitioning for release shall transmit a copy of
the petition to the Attorney General, to the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney wherein the defendant was charged, and to the Commissioner.
2. Upon the submission of a petition pursuant to this section, the
committing court shall conduct the proceedings according to the pro-
cedures set forth in subsection F.
H. CONDITIONAL RELEASE; CRITERIA; CONDITIONS; REPORTS:
At any time the court considers the committed person's need for inpa-
tient hospitalization pursuant to this article, it shall place the commit-
ted person on conditional release if it finds that (i) based on
consideration of the factors which the court must consider in its com-
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mitment decision, he does not need inpatient hospitalization but
needs outpatient treatment or monitoring to prevent his condition
from deteriorating to a degree that he would need inpatient hospitali-
zation; (ii) appropriate outpatient supervision and treatment are rea-
sonably available; (iii) there is significant reason to believe that the
committed person, if conditionally released, would comply with the
conditions specified; and (iv) conditional release will not present an
undue risk to public safety. The court shall subject a conditionally re-
leased committed person to such orders and conditions it deems will
best meet the committed person's need for treatment and supervision
and best serve the interests of justice and society.
The Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Sub-
stance Abuse Services shall implement the court's conditional release
orders and shall submit written reports to the court on the committed
person's progress and adjustment in the community no less frequently
than every six months. The Department of Mental Health, Mental
Retardation and Substance Abuse Services shall send a copy of each
written report submitted to the court and copies of all correspondence
with the court pursuant to this section to the Attorney General, to the
Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the defendant was charged, and
to the Commissioner.
I. EMERGENCY CUSTODY OF CONDITIONALLY RELEASED PERSON;
REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL RELEASE:
A judicial officer may issue an emergency custody order, upon the
sworn petition of any responsible person, or upon his own motion,
based upon probable cause to believe that a person on conditional
release within his judicial district has violated the conditions of his
release and is no longer a proper subject for conditional release. The
emergency custody order shall require a law-enforcement officer to
take the person into custody immediately and transport him to a con-
venient location specified in the order where a person designated by
the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance
Abuse Services shall, as soon as practicable, evaluate him for the pur-
pose of determining the nature and degree of violation of the condi-
tions of his release. A copy of the petition shall be sent to the
Attorney General, to the Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the de-
fendant was charged, and to the Commissioner.
The person on conditional release shall remain in custody until a hear-
ing is held in the circuit court on the motion or petition to determine if
he should be returned to the custody of the Commissioner. Such
hearing shall be given priority on the court's docket. If upon hearing
1244 [Vol. 56:1221
INDEFINITE DETENTION
the evidence, the court finds that the person on conditional release
has violated the conditions of his release and that the violation of con-
ditions was sufficient to render him no longer suitable for conditional
release, the court shall revoke his conditional release and order him
returned to the custody of the Commissioner for inpatient treatment.
The person may petition the original committing court for re-release
pursuant to the conditions set forth in subsection E no sooner than six
months from his return to custody. The party petitioning for re-re-
lease shall transmit a copy of the petition to the Attorney General, to
the Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the defendant was charged,
and to the Commissioner.
J. MODIFICATION OR REMOVAL OF CONDITIONS; NOTICE; OBJEC-
TIONS; REVIEW:
1. The committing court may modify conditions of release or remove
conditions placed on release pursuant to subsection H, upon petition
of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Sub-
stance Abuse Services, the supervising parole or probation officer, the
Attorney General, the Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the defen-
dant was charged, or the person on conditional release, or upon its
own motion based on reports of the Department of Mental Health,
Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services or the supervising
parole or probation officer. However, the person on conditional re-
lease may petition only annually commencing six months after the
conditional release order is issued. Upon petition, the court shall re-
quire the Department, or, if the person is on parole or probation, the
person's parole or probation officer, to provide a report on the per-
son's progress while on conditional release. The party petitioning for
release shall transmit a copy of the petition to the Attorney General,
to the Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the defendant was charged,
and to the Commissioner.
2. As it deems appropriate based on the Department's report and any
other evidence provided to it, the court may issue a proposed order
for modification or removal of conditions. The court shall provide no-
tice of the order, and their right to object to it within 21 days of its
issuance, to the person, the Department or parole or probation of-
ficer, the Commonwealth's Attorney wherein the defendant was
charged, and the Attorney General. The proposed order shall become
final if no objection is filed within 21 days of its issuance. If an objec-
tion is so filed, the court shall conduct a hearing at which the person
on conditional release, the Attorney General, and the Department or
the parole or probation officer, have an opportunity to present evi-
dence challenging the proposed order. At the conclusion of the hear-
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ing, the court shall issue an order specifying conditions of release or
removing existing conditions of release.
K. REPRESENTATION OF COMMONWEALTH AND PERSON SUBJECT TO
COMMITMENT; NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
The Attorney General shall represent the Commonwealth in all pro-
ceedings held pursuant to this article. The Attorney General shall re-
ceive prior written notice of all proceedings held under this article in
which he is to represent the Commonwealth.
The court shall appoint counsel for the person subject to commitment
or conditional release unless such person waives his right to counsel.
The court shall consider appointment of the person who represented
the person in previous proceedings.
All proceedings held under this article shall be civil proceedings.
L. AUTHORITY OF COMMISSIONER; DELEGATION TO BOARD;
LIABILITY:
For the purposes of carrying out the duties of this article, the Commis-
sioner may appoint an advisory board composed of persons with
demonstrated expertise in such matters. The Department of Mental
Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services shall assist
the board in its administrative and technical duties. The membership
of the board shall include (i) a citizen appointed by the Commissioner,
(ii) a psychiatrist or psychologist licensed to practice in the Common-
wealth and who is a full-time employee of the Department of Correc-
tions, to be appointed by its director, (iii) a member of the
Department of State Police, and (iv) such other members as deemed
appropriate by the Commissioner. Members of the board shall exer-
cise their powers and duties without compensation, except that mem-
bers of the board who are not state employees shall be reimbursed by
the Department for their approved travel expenses to the meetings of
this board at the approved state rate. Members of the board shall be
immune from personal liability while acting within the scope of their
duties except for intentional misconduct.
M. ESCAPE OF PERSONS PLACED OR COMMITTED; PENALTY:
Any person committed to the custody of the Commissioner pursuant
to this article who escapes from such custody shall be guilty of a Class
6 felony.
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N. PERSONS ON CONDITIONAL RELEASE LEAVING COMMONWEALTH;
PENALTY:
Any person placed on conditional release pursuant to this article who
leaves the Commonwealth without permission from the court which
conditionally released the person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Insert the following new section: Section 19.2-169.3.2
Section 3. Treatment of unrestorable defendants
The hospital may treat a defendant who is committed pursuant to
§ 19.2-169.3.1 with any medical treatment necessary to protect his own
safety or the safety of others, provided that such treatment is medi-
cally appropriate and takes into account less intrusive alternatives.
The hospital may not authorize medical treatment solely intended to
restore a patient to competency.
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